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ABSTRACT
Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders  provide
an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this
market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these
constraints may not survive in systems competition, as systems competition is likely to suffer from the
same type of information asymmetry which induced the private market failure and which brought in the
government in the first place (Selection Principle). As national solvency regulation creates a positive
international policy externality on foreign lenders of domestic banks, there will be an undersupply of such
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Banking Risks  
Banking is not a safe business. Banks can have bad luck when they finance private investment and they 
can go bankrupt, inflicting a loss on savers who do not get their money back. To keep the risks under 
control, the banking business is heavily regulated in most countries, but not in all. Where the regulation 
is lax there tend to be problems. This paper provides a welfare analysis of banking regulation and studies 
the competitive forces affecting this type of regulation in systems competition.  
  The Asian banking crisis demonstrates clearly how important the risks resulting from loose 
banking regulation can be. The crisis began in Thailand. Foreign bank lenders went on strike when they 
witnessed that Thai banks were issuing excessively bad loans, and so the Thai bath depreciated strongly. 
In South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines the situation was no 
different, and the currencies of these countries soon followed similar paths, leaving a long trail of 
bankrupt banks behind. The Asian banking crisis propelled the Asian economies into a sharp recession 
in 1998, which had severe repercussions on economic growth in the rest of the world.  
  The Asian problems had been preceded by the S&L crisis in the United States and the Mexican 
crisis in the early 1990s. Both of these crises had a weaker impact on the world economy because they 
had been mitigated with generous loans by the US government and the IMF. However, they had paved 
the way for the Asian disaster by making financial investors aware of the risks they were facing.  
  While the various banking crises had many facets which cannot be discussed here, there seems to 
be a common element in that the banks were undercapitalised and had taken excessive risks in the 
capital market. For instance, in Korea the equity asset ratio fell from 9.5% in 1990 to 6.5% in 1996, the 
year before the crisis began, and in Mexico the ratio fell from 6.24 % in 1990 to 5.5% in 1994, the year 
of the crisis.
1 There are illustrative descriptions by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Dekle and 
Kletzer (2001), Kane (2000) and Calomiris and Powell (2000), showing that in East Asia as well as 
                                                 
1 OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks, 2000.    4
Mexico, a substantial part of the problem had indeed been excessive risk-taking and the lack of domestic 
bank regulation. In Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, banking regulation was 
fragmented between different regulatory agencies, and overall was too lenient or simply ignored in 
practice. In his Munich Lectures, Dornbusch (1998) argued that it was primarily the preceding 
liberalisation of bank regulation which had made the Asian crisis possible and led the world into a 
recession.
2  
  Undercapitalisation not only makes a bank vulnerable in a crisis, it could even trigger off the 
crisis by inducing excessive risk taking when the bank enjoys the privilege of limited liability as all 
corporations do. When the equity base is low, limited liability effectively truncates the probability 
distributions of income among which a bank can choose and thus creates an artificial type of risk loving  
behaviour which was characterised (Sinn 1980, 1982) by the term ￿BLOOS rule￿, after the English 
proverb ￿You can￿t get blood out of a stone￿.
3 As will be clarified in a separate section below, this is 
basically the same as what was later called a gamble for resurrection or  resuscitation.  
  Because of the Asian banking crisis, the issue of how  sound banking behaviour could be 
assured has regained much attention in the public debate, including that between the IMF and the World 
Bank. Often this debate neglects the implications of the BLOOS rule, but the Basel I Accord of 1988 and 
the new Basel II Accord, which is currently being negotiated and is scheduled to be implemented in 
2005, do reflect the concerns implied in this rule. Both accords define minimum equity requirements of 
banks, but Basel II allows for a  fine tuning in that the banks are obliged to assess the risks of their 
borrowers and to allocate specific equity amounts to them in order to minimise the bankruptcy risk. 
                                                 
2 The macroeconomic implications are not self-evident, though. Blum and Hellwig (1995) argued that banking regulation 
itself tends to bring about business cycle risks, because the solvency requirements imply particularly harsh credit constraints 
in a time of  recession.   
3 ￿Sinn (1980)￿ refers to the German publication of the author￿s 1977 dissertation where the phenomenon had been called 
MAEHKMINN-Regel (Mehr als er hat kann man ihm nicht nehmen.) The term BLOOS rule was chosen in the translation that 
came out with North Holland in 1983, as cited in the references.    5
  The Basel Accords can be seen as reactions to the failure of international systems competition in 
the context of banking regulation. If systems competition had functioned well, common minimum equity 
and risk assessment rules would not have been necessary. Instead, each country could have defined its 
rules unilaterally, and the international competition of such rules could then have shown which ones 
perform best. However, the various banking crises have created sufficiently serious doubts concerning 
the self-regulatory forces of international systems competition to warrant a closer scrutiny of the problem 
.  
  This paper studies the international competition of banking regulation in the context of a simple 
model of financial intermediation where investment banks collect funds from savers to lend them to 




A theoretical justification for the mistrust in systems competition can be found in the lemons problem. 
The potential lemon good that banks offer to their customers is bonds, the quality of these bonds being 
defined in terms of the probability at which banks do not go bankrupt and the amount of loan repayment 
they can ensure even if they do.  
  The bank￿s repayment or survival probability depends on the riskiness of the projects chosen, and 
the loan repayment in the case of bankruptcy depends on the equity the bank owns. The more risk the 
bank takes and the lower its equity capital, the lower is the quality of the bonds it issues.  
  If bond purchasers could observe the bank￿s investment decisions and make a judgement on the 
appropriateness of its equity base, they would punish any kind of opportunistic bank behaviour by 
requiring a sufficiently high rate of interest to compensate for the reduced quality of the bonds they buy 
or by not buying the bonds at all. The bank would therefore not be able to increase its expected profit by   6
deteriorating the bond quality. However, in the presence of asymmetric information, i.e. an imperfect 
visibility of an individual bank￿s risk choices, the bank may be able to get away with lowering the 
quality of the bonds by reducing the expected value of loan repayment without having to offer a higher 
rate of interest in return.  
  Such asymmetry in information is indeed realistic because banking is an extremely sophisticated 
and complicated enterprise, making it hard even for members of a bank supervisory board to keep sight 
of the risks their bank incurs.
4 The financial instruments that banks use for their business have become 
so sophisticated and so much business is happening outside the balance sheets that the assumption of 
well-informed savers would be heroic if not absurd. It is true that savers can observe the equity base of a 
bank and certain other characteristics, but in order to understand what they mean, they would have to be 
able to monitor the banks￿ off-balance sheet business and to become banking specialists. Even the close 
monitoring of a bank￿s history does not convey the necessary information because bankruptcy is not only 
a rare, but also a non-repeating event. The best the bank lenders can achieve is getting some idea of the 
average frequency of bank failures in general and of the amounts of funds normally repaid in such 
events.  
  The knowledge of the general market situation may prevent bank lenders from being 
systematically expropriated by the banks, because they will require, and be able to receive, a rate of 
interest sufficiently high to compensate for the possibility of non-performance. However, market 
knowledge does not provide the lenders with the information necessary to distinguish between good and 
bad banks and will therefore not be able to exclude opportunistic banking behaviour. Unregulated banks 
may get stuck in an inefficient equilibrium, where they all choose some degree of overly risky behaviour. 
A bank which decides to offer a safer product, i.e. a bond with a higher expected repayment value, may 
not be able to convey this information to its lenders and may therefore not be able to borrow at a lower 
                                                 
4 The author is a member of the supervisory board of an international baking group.    7
rate of interest than its competitors can. Offering a safer bond would just increase its expected repayment 
and lower its expected profit.  
  To help the bank lenders make better investment decisions, private rating agencies such as 
Moody￿s or Standard & Poor have developed systems that rank banks by the estimated safety of their 
business. However, as the S&L debacle and the Asian crisis have demonstrated, these agencies are far 
from perfect and unable to provide the market with timely ranking revisions in response to banks￿ 
actions. Only in retrospect did the investors become aware of the true riskiness of their engagements; the 
rating agencies had not been able to warn them in time. The crises showed that there was still substantial 
scope for opportunistic banking behaviour behind the public￿s back.  
  To protect bank lenders, often ordinary people who entrusted their lifetime savings to the banks, 
many governments have imposed solvency regulations on banks or insisted on tough self-regulation 
rules imposed by national banking associations. Some countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, and 
after the Asian crisis Japan, have imposed very strict regulations, such as minimum legal reserves and 
extensive creditor rights; others, like France, the United Kingdom or the United States, have placed more 
confidence in self-regulation. 
  While the national regulation decisions were normally designed in periods where the banks￿ 
lenders were predominantly nationals, globalisation has changed the situation substantially. International 
banking competition has become fierce, possible acquisitions by competitors have become a constant 
threat to banking managers, and cheap international refinancing has become the clue for banking success 
in all countries. Banks have internationalised faster than other institutions and firms, and in many 
countries the share of foreigners among their lenders has increased substantially over recent years. In   8
Germany, for example, this share doubled in the sixteen years from 1980 through 1996.
5 Figure 1 gives 
an overview of the situation prevailing among a selection of OECD countries in 1996.  
 
Figure 1: Share of Liabilities to Non-residents in 1996 
OECD (2000)Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks. 
 
  The increasing fraction of foreigners among the banks￿ lenders may change the national 
governments￿ attitudes towards banking regulation since part of the benefits from banking regulation 
spills over to foreigners while domestic banks may suffer from the constraints imposed upon them. This 
is the theme of this chapter, and we will see which theoretical basis can be laid. 
 
                                                 
5 A clear upward trend was observable in 12 of 16 countries for which we had data. In the Scandinavian countries, Spain and 
Italy the trend was particularly pronounced. However, there were exceptions like Holland or France where the share remained 





























A Note on the Literature on Limited Liability and Risk Taking 
Before undertaking the formal analysis, a note on the literature may be appropriate. While there seem to 
be virtually no studies on the competition of banking regulators, there is a literature showing that limited 
liability may imply excessive risk taking. As argued above, limited liability can result in excessive risk 
taking if the parties sustaining the potential losses are unable to negotiate for compensation before or 
while the risk-taking decision is made. In principle, there are at least three reasons why such negotiation 
may not be possible. 
i) The party sustaining the losses has a binding contract with the firm, which is sufficiently incomplete to 
exclude the commitment to a cautious risk strategy. Thus the firm has no incentive to act cautiously even 
if the party sustaining the loss perfectly foresaw its actions at the time of signing the contract.  
ii) The party sustaining the loss has no contractual relationship with the firm, and the potential loss is 
indivisible among a large number of disadvantaged people so that the public goods nature of the problem 
excludes private side payments along Coasian lines.  
iii) The party sustaining the loss makes a contract with the firm when or before it chooses its risk 
strategy, but it is unable to monitor the firm￿s actions.  
  Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 130-33) studied an example with a sequential borrowing and 
investment decision of a firm which falls under category i).
6 Sinn (1980, 1982) investigated the artificial 
incentive for risk taking for the cases of Bernoullian and  σ − µ  preferences, using assumptions ii) and 
iii).
7 With regard to assumption ii) he referred to examples like nuclear power plants, chemical plants 
and automobile liability risks, and he applied assumption iii) to product liability risks in pharmaceutical 
products, air planes, cable cars, and the like. The BLOOS rule which was developed in this context, 
reappeared later under names like ￿gamble for resurrection￿ or ￿gamble for resuscitation￿. Authors like 
                                                 
6 This is similar to Kydland and Prescott￿s (1977) theory of time consistency. 
7 See Sinn (1982, pp. 329-31).   10
Minsky (1991), Goodhard (1991, p. 15), Rochet (1992, pp. 1157-59), Dow (1996) and Gollier, Koehl 
and Rochet (1997) have made useful contributions along these lines.
8 
  Jensen and Meckling￿s assumption i) has its merits when firms have taken long term loans and 
find themselves in an end-game situation. However, the repeated nature of the regular banking business 
and the fact that most securities issued by banks have a very short maturity reduces the practical 
relevance for this assumption in the banking context. When a bank￿s clients can perfectly monitor its 
actions, as the authors assume,  and when there is no clear time structure with regard to the bank￿s risk 
choices and the continuous flow of newly issued bank securities, as is the case in reality, there is every 
reason to assume that the rate of return offered for these securities will fully reflect these choices and 
that the bank￿s investment decisions are undistorted. Thus assumption i) would not be a strong argument 
in favour of banking regulation and is hence not very well suited for a meaningful study of systems 
competition.  
  For the reasons explained, this paper studies the risk taking of banks under assumption iii), 
interpreting the lemon bond problem as a problem of product liability risks. The assumption that it is not 
possible to monitor the relevant actions sufficiently well to punish any kind of opportunistic behaviour 
by negotiating for better contract terms in exchange does indeed seem realistic in the banking context.  
 
Banking with Unlimited Liability: The Basic Model 
To investigate the information asymmetry between a bank and its lenders formally, a model of a market 
for bank intermediation is considered. For didactic purposes, the analysis begins with a simplified 
version of the model without limited liability. The discussion of this feature is delegated to the next 
section. 
  There is a capital market with three types of assets:  
                                                 
8 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Hellwig and Bester (1987), referred to related phenomena when they explained why banks can   11
i) Safe assets with a fixed rate of return s ￿ 1 such as government saving bonds.  
ii) Bonds issued by banks which promise, but will not necessarily pay, a rate of return r ￿ 1. 
iii) Business loans which pay a target rate of return q ￿ 1 if the business is successful, which happens 
with probability p,  0 1 > > p , but pay no return and incur the total loss of capital if the business fails.  
In the model, sis exogenously given, but r and q will be explained endogenously.   
  Private households can directly invest in the first and second types of assets, but can channel 
their funds into the third type only indirectly, via the intermediation of private banks, because there are 
prohibitive transactions costs involved by lending directly. The model concentrates on investment 
banking, abstracting from deposit insurance.
9 There is a fixed number of competitive banks which face 
an inelastic demand for funds, F, by private firms. The target rate of return factor q can be chosen by the 
bank by controlling the type of business investment it wants to finance. There are options with high 
levels of q and low success probabilities p, and vice versa. In general we assume that the set of efficient 
return-probability tuples available to the bank can be described by a function p(q), 0 ’< p . All agents are 
risk neutral and banks do not diversify their lending risks, specialising on lending to a selected client or 
clients whose risks are perfectly correlated. The risks among the clients of different banks are 
uncorrelated, but each of the identical competitive banks faces the same choice set of attainable 
probability distributions. 
  If the risks among the various types of business firms are uncorrelated, the lenders￿ risk neutrality 
can be justified with the assumption that they diversify their risks among the various bank bonds, and the 
banks￿ risk neutrality (with regard to the legal wealth distributions it faces) can be explained by their 
owners￿ perfect diversification among bank shares and other assets. The assumption that banks 
                                                                                                                                                                         
avoid the opportunistic behaviour of their clients by imposing credit constraints. 
9 The bonds introduced above can also be interpreted as interest bearing deposits. Note, however, that while deposit insurance 
is common among OECD countries, none has an insurance for bank bonds and other financial instruments that the banks use 
to collect their funds. Deposits and deposit insurance are essential ingredients of savings banks, but otherwise they are of 
limited importance.    12
specialise on just one firm or one class of perfectly correlated risks can, in turn, be justified by 
prohibitive information costs or the fact that the BLOOS rule is operative and induces a maximum of 
risk taking for any given value of expected legal profits.
10 
  Consider first the case of unlimited liability where banks will always keep their promises. Here, 
bank bonds are safe assets and arbitrage in the capital market assures that they generate the same return 
as government bonds.  
 
(1)       s = r . 
 
Consider a representative bank. The expected profit of the bank choosing a project with a target return of 
size q is  
 
(2)     () F r q q p ⋅ − = π ) (   E . 
 
The optimal risk strategy maximises the expected return from business lending. It is given by the return-
probability tuple at which the marginal expected revenue from business lending is zero:  
 




                                                 
10 Strictly speaking this assumption will only be justified within the model set up in the next section where the BLOOS rule is 
operative. The BLOOS rule implies that the indifference curves in  σ − µ space are concave when the true degree of risk 
aversion is sufficiently small or the legal probability distributions of wealth extend far enough into the negative range (see 
Sinn 1980), which may be the case when the bank￿s investment in risky assets exceeds its equity capital. Concave indifference 
curves clearly imply that that the bank prefers not to diversify its risks.   13
Lemon Banking and the BLOOS Rule  
In the model set up thus far, bonds are not lemon goods because unlimited bank liability ensures that the 
lender gets exactly what the bank promises. However, unlimited liability is far from being realistic, 
given that no one can lose more than he has. You cannot get blood out of a stone (BLOOS rule). If the 
bank￿s equity capital is exhausted, bank lenders will not be able to collect the promised return and they 
may even lose part of the loan capital they provided.  
 Let  C be the equity capital the bank owns at the beginning of the period and assume it invests this 
capital at the safe rate of return s ￿ 1, using the proceeds from bond issues, F, for the business 
investment it finances. If the business project is successful, the bank will be able to service the bonds it 
issued and its value will be  F r q C s ) ( − + ⋅ . If, on the other hand, the business project fails, the value of 
the bank will be  rF sC −  or 0, whichever is higher. This is what the BLOOS rule implies. Multiplying 
the possible states of bank value with their probabilities and subtracting the end-of-period value of the 
initial equity capital gives the following expression for the representative bank￿s expected profit:  
 
(4)     () ( ) sC rF sC q p F r q sC q p − − ⋅ − + ⋅ − + = π ) 0 , ( max ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( E . 
 
If the bank￿s equity capital exceeds its repayment obligation,  rF sC > , this expression coincides with 
(2). The limited liability constraint is not binding and the same type of equilibrium emerges as was 
discussed above. If, on the other hand, the bank￿s equity is insufficient to satisfy its repayment 
obligation,  rF sC < , the BLOOS rule becomes operative and creates an artificial risk preference which 
may change the bank￿s behaviour. This is the case on which the subsequent analysis will concentrate. 
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Figure 2: Kinked Utility and the BLOOS Rule  
 
 
  The nature of the artificial risk preference resulting from the BLOOS rule can be illustrated by 
means of the kinked utility curve as introduced in Sinn (1980, p. 165; 1982) and represented in Figure 2. 
The diagram refers to the alternative states of nature ￿success￿ and ￿failure￿. The abscissa shows the 
bank￿s ￿legal￿ end-of-period wealth if liability were unlimited, and the ordinate shows the actual end-of-
period wealth given that it is, in fact, limited. Because of risk neutrality, actual wealth can be taken to be 
the bank￿s (or the bank owners￿) utility. Without business lending, legal and actual wealth would be  C s . 
With business lending, legal wealth obtains two possible states:  F r q C s ) ( − + ⋅ in the case of success 
and  rF sC −  in the case of failure. Because of the BLOOS rule the utility curve is effectively horizontal 
for negative legal wealth levels. No matter how strongly negative legal wealth becomes, utility and 
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actual wealth cannot fall short of the level which is obtained in the case of zero legal wealth. Thus, even 
though rF sC − is negative, actual wealth is zero in the case of failure. 
  Consider now the bank￿s expected utility and the safety equivalent of the legal wealth 
distribution. Expected utility is a linear combination of the utility levels obtained in the two states of 
nature,  F r q C s ) ( − + ⋅ and zero, with the weights p and  p − 1 . As expected legal wealth is a linear 
combination of  F r q C s ) ( − + ⋅  and  rF sC −  with the same weights, expected utility can be constructed 
graphically by moving from expected legal wealth on the abscissa upwards to the cord between the two 
possible points on the utility curve. The safety equivalent is defined as that safe level of wealth which 
generates the same utility as the probability distribution under consideration. The safety equivalent can 
therefore be constructed by continuing the move from the cord horizontally to the utility curve and from 
there back to the abscissa, as is illustrated with the arrows. It is obvious from the diagram that the 
effective convexity of the utility curve following from the BLOOS rule implies risk loving behaviour in 
the sense that the safety equivalent of the bank￿s legal wealth distribution is above the bank￿s expected 
level of legal wealth, and the risk premium is negative. In its choice between safe and risky strategies, 
the bank is willing to sacrifice expected legal wealth in exchange for the possibility of taking more risks, 
because, given the rate of return promised to lenders, more risks will generate more expected actual 
wealth and hence more expected utility.  
  Of course, however, the rate of return promised to lenders may not be given but depend on the 
actions of the bank. Lenders will know from their general market observation that the repayment 
promise of banks cannot be taken for granted. Thus the promised rate of return on bank bonds will have 
to be sufficiently high to compensate for the reduced payment in the case of bankruptcy. Risk neutrality 
implies that a capital market equilibrium is characterised by the equality between the expected 
repayment of a bank bond and the repayment of a safe asset. As the repayment of a bank bond is equal to   16
the bank￿s promise in the case of success and equal to its equity capital in the case of failure, the 
equilibrium condition can be taken to be 
 
(5)     () sF sC q p rF q p = ⋅ − + ⋅ ) ( 1 ) (  for  sC rF ≥ . 
 
  The important question is, whether and to what extent the constraint imposed by equation (5) will 
affect the behaviour of banks. The answer depends on which of two possible interpretations of this 
equation, a narrow one or a wide one, is correct. The narrow one is that equation (5) applies to an 
individual bank￿s actions and shows how the lender￿s required rate of interest reacts to the bank￿s policy 
choices. The wide interpretation is that equation (5) is only an equilibrium condition, determining the 
market rate of interest paid by banks without implying that the single bank can affect this rate through its 
own policy decisions.  
  If the narrow interpretation is true, the BLOOS rule will have no behavioural implications 
relative to the model set up in the previous section. Inserting equation (5) into (4) gives again equation 
(2) when account is taken of (1), and this is true even if the BLOOS rule is operative. As the bank is 
unable to manipulate the expected rate of interest paid to its lenders, this rate being equal to the one on 
safe assets, s ￿ 1, it will still aim at maximising the expected return from business lending as is ensured 
by marginal condition (3).  
  However, for the reasons explained above, the extent of household information of the bank￿s 
actions may not go far enough to justify the narrow interpretation. If bank lenders are unable to monitor 
the individual bank￿s actions ex ante and are therefore unable to anticipate these actions with an 
appropriate interest demand, the bank￿s decision problem is no longer compatible with a maximisation 
of equation (2), because the bank does not have to alter the promised rate of return, r ￿ 1, when it 
changes its risk policy, given that the other banks stick to whatever policies they choose. To understand   17
the bank￿s incentives in the case of constant r and the BLOOS rule being operative, rewrite equation (4) 
in the form  
 
(6)   () ( ) ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( E q p sC rF F r q q p − − + − ⋅ = π   for  sC rF ≥  
 
and compare with equation (2). The first item on the right-hand side again is the expected profit in the 
case of success provided that the bank services its bonds under all circumstances. However, the second 
item measures the advantage resulting from the fact that the bank does not fully service its bonds under 
all circumstances but only in the case of survival. In the case of bankruptcy the bank can avoid that part 
of the promised loan repayment which exceeds its equity capital,  sC rF − , and this advantage 
contributes to the expected profit to the extent of the probability that it happens,  ) ( 1 q p − . There is a 
negative marginal externality imposed on the bank￿s lenders which may distort the bank￿s decisions.  
  The single bank will try to maximise (6) for a given r, notwithstanding the fact that r  is 
determined by the equilibrium condition (5). The bank￿s choice variables are the target return in the case 
of success, q, including the corresponding success probability, p(q), and the amount of equity capital, C. 
Assuming that equity capital is constrained from below,  0 ≥ ε ≥ C , the Lagrangean of the bank￿s 
decision problem can be written as  
 
   () ( ) ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ε − λ + − − + − ⋅ = C q p sC rF F r q q p L   for   sC rF ≥ ,  
 
where λ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. The resulting optimality conditions are 
  
(7)     0 ) )( ( ’ ) ( ) ( ’ = − − + sC rF q p F q p qF q p   for  sC rF ≥ , 
   18
(8)     () ) ( 1 q p s − = λ  
and 
(9)     0 ) ( = ε − ⋅ λ C . 
 
  A comparison between optimality conditions (3) and (7) reveals that the bank￿s risk choices are 
indeed distorted. The first two items in (7) give the marginal expected revenue from seeking a higher 
rate of return. With unlimited liability they sum up to zero since the bank goes to the point where the 
increase in the target rate of return from business lending is outweighed by the corresponding reduction 
in the probability of success. With limited liability this policy is no longer optimal since increasing the 
target rate of return has the additional advantage that the state of nature where the lenders will have to 
satisfy themselves with the bank￿s equity capital,  C s , rather than the promised repayment rF, becomes 
more probable, the marginal increase in the probability being measured by  ) ( ’ q p − . 
  The bank￿s optimum now lies beyond the point of maximum expected revenue from business 
lending because there is a negative marginal externality it can impose on its lenders by reducing the 
probability of success. Given the expected return from business investment, a high target return which 
accrues with a low probability is better than a low target return with a high probability, because the 
expected loan repayment is lower. Thus, choosing a lower survival probability and a higher target return 
may be better for the bank even if this implies a somewhat lower expected return to business lending. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the distortion in the bank￿s decision problem. The upper of the two downward 
sloping curves is the graph of the function  ) (q p , i.e. the probability of successful business lending as a 
function of the target return factor, and the lower one shows the bank￿s marginal expected revenue from 
business lending. Formally, the relationship between the two curves is similar to that between a demand 
curve and a marginal revenue curve, but of course, this is nothing but a formal similarity. The point of 
maximum expected revenue is where the expected marginal revenue curve cuts the abscissa (A), but the   19
bank￿s optimum is where the expected marginal revenue is sufficiently negative to compensate for the 
advantage of being able to impose a negative marginal externality on its lenders. In the diagram this 
marginal externality is measured by the distance between the abscissa and the horizontal line below it. 
Thus the point of intersection between this line and the marginal expected revenue curve, C, is the firm￿s 
optimum in the case where the BLOOS rule is operative. 
 
Figure 3: The bank￿s optimal risk choice under the BLOOS rule 
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While there is an interior optimum for the bank￿s risk choice, there is a corner solution for its 
equity capital. As equation (8) reveals that λ is positive, it follows from (9) that  
 
(10)     ε = C ; 
 
i.e. the bank will choose as little equity as possible for its operations. This is a straightforward 
implication of the BLOOS rule. The higher the equity capital, the higher is the payment to lenders in the 
case of failure, and the higher is the expected refinancing cost. Clearly, therefore, the bank prefers to 
operate with as little equity as possible and takes only the quantity which it must. 
  The result contradicts the Modigliani-Miller theorem according to which a firm￿s debt-equity 
choice is indeterminate.
11 However, that theorem was derived by abstracting from limited liability and 
asymmetric information. In the present context, equity capital is more expensive than debt capital for the 
banking firm since an increase of equity capital increases the payments to lenders in the case of 
bankruptcy which ignorant lenders will not honour with a lower interest requirement. From a practical 
perspective, the fact that equity capital is much more expensive than debt capital is obvious for any 
banking business. Bank managers are eager to spare equity capital whenever they can and to run their 
banks with as little equity as possible, certainly far less than necessary to be able to cover all the risks 
they incur.  
 
The result of this section can be summarised as follows. 
                                                 
11 Modigliani (1961 and 1982) and Miller (1977).   21
Proposition 1: The combination of limited liability (BLOOS rule) and incomplete information of its 
lenders induces the banks to minimise their equity volumes and to choose riskier strategies of business 
lending than in the case of unlimited liability. Banks choose to offer their lenders lemon bonds which 
will not be serviced with certainty.  
 
Welfare Implications and Optimal Regulation 
From a social perspective, the bank￿s risk taking is excessive. It is true that risk taking often is 
productive in the sense that it enables people to make use of the opportunities nature offers them. Risk 
consolidating devices such as insurance and stock markets can be seen as augmenting one of the 
economy￿s most important factors of production (Sinn 1986) and to have significant growth effects. 
However, in the present context, risk taking may be excessive because it is induced by an externality 
which the bank imposes on its lenders rather than a consolidating activity.  
 Assume  that  s measures the true social opportunity cost of bank lending, that q and 0 denote the 
true social returns from business lending in the cases of success and failure, and that the probability p is 
both the subjective and objective probability of success. Then welfare W is given by the difference 
between the expected social return of business lending and the alternative return which savers could 
have earned had they invested their funds in the capital market: 
  
(11)   () F s q q p W ⋅ − = ) ( . 
 
The optimal amount of risk taking as measured by the target return and the optimal success probability 
follow from the first-order condition of a maximum of (11),  
 
(12)     0 ) ( ) ( ’ = + q p q q p .   22
 
Obviously, it coincides with the bank￿s optimum in the case of unlimited liability, as defined by equation 
(3). 
  The social optimum is given by point A in Figure 3. The welfare loss from choosing point C 
instead of A is given by the shaded area ABC between the marginal expected revenue curve and the 
abscissa. The area shows by how much the expected revenue from business lending declines due to the 
banks￿ attempts to reduce the expected loan repayment to its lenders.  
  Interestingly enough the banks burn their own fingers with this policy, because it is they alone 
who bear the welfare loss resulting from their opportunistic behaviour. Because of (5), lenders will be 
able to receive a fair compensation for the bankruptcy risk in a market equilibrium. The welfare loss 
shows up exclusively in terms of a reduction of bank profits and hence a corresponding decline in the 
value of banking firms. Households suffer no loss although they buy the lemon bonds.  
  The irony of the result can be seen most clearly in Figure 3. Suppose for a moment, all banks 
choose point A. By moving from A to C, the single bank can increase its profit by an amount given by 
the area ACD, because it reduces its expected loan repayment to its lenders by an amount equal to the 
area ABCD which is more than the decline in the expected return from business lending, ABC. 
However, if all banks behave that way, different lending conditions will emerge where the banks￿ 
lenders will be able to fully avoid a disadvantage. If all banks operate at point C instead of A, they are 
unable to reduce the expected loan repayment, and hence their profits fall by the area ABC. This can be 
summarised as follows.  
 
Proposition 2: The risk-taking resulting from the BLOOS rule and asymmetric information is too large 
from a welfare perspective. The welfare loss will be borne by the banks alone and result in reduced 
banking profits.    23
 
  The remedy to cure the market failure is some sort of collective action which imposes constraints 
on the single bank￿s behaviour. This could be an agreement among the banks, or it could be banking 
laws that exclude misbehaviour. The national solutions differ in this regard. There is a multitude of 
constraints which the countries impose on their banks, but the imposition of bank solvency rules in the 
sense of setting minimum equity requirements seems to be common to all major countries.  
  The model set up above shows that this is indeed a useful approach. Let εbe the minimum 
amount of equity capital required by law. From equations (7) and (10) it follows that it is possible to 
reduce opportunistic behaviour by increasing this minimum. The higher ε, the lower is the marginal 
externality distorting the bank￿s behaviour, and the lower is the extent of risk-taking as represented by 
the size of the target return: 
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is the second-order condition for the bank￿s optimisation problem, which is assumed to be satisfied. It is 
even possible to induce firms to behave optimally. If  rF s ≥ ε , it follows from (7) that there is no 
distortion at all because the equity capital is large enough to prevent the BLOOS rule from becoming 
operative.
12 This can be summarised as follows. 
                                                 
12 Under realistic conditions, the bank￿s probability distribution has a very long, but thin lower tail. To ensure that this tail lies 
completely in the range of positive legal wealth levels, a very large equity stock could be necessary, but such a strict 
interpretation of the model would make little sense. If only part of the tail of the probability distribution lies in the range of 
negative legal wealth, the firm￿s risk preferences may still be fairly normal and may not imply a pathological degree of risk-
taking. See Sinn (1980, Chapter III, Section B1).   24
 
Proposition 3: With the imposition of minimum equity requirements it is possible to reduce and even 
avoid the welfare loss from excessive risk-taking which is implied by the BLOOS rule.  
 
 
The Competition of Banking Regulation 
While it is in the national, and even the national banks￿, interest to impose minimum equity 
requirements when all competing banks are governed by them, things may be different, of course, in an 
international context. Although the banks themselves have tended to lobby for strict national banking 
rules, their interest in such rules has been fading away with the rapid globalisation of recent years. The 
argument used by banking representatives is that the unilateral imposition of tough banking rules is 
unfair since these rules increase the national cost of the banking business and imply a competitive 
disadvantage relative to the rest of the world. 
  The argument would make little sense if it could be assumed that international lenders reward 
tough national banking laws by sufficing themselves with lower rates of interest, knowing that the bonds 
they buy have a higher quality than those of other countries. But obviously, the banking representatives 
do not believe that international lenders behave this way. While it is true that the refinancing rates differ 
to some degree according to the assessment of the rating agencies, there is the widespread fear that the 
observable differences by no means reflect the true differences of the risks imposed on lenders. The bank 
lobbies￿ pressure on national governments not to impose stricter banking rules than do competing 
countries is therefore overwhelming, and in fact the pressure goes in the direction of national 
liberalisation. The Asian banking crisis, which in the opinion of many observers could have been 
prevented with stricter banking laws, may have been the result of a competition of laxity in regulation.    25
  Suppose for a moment that this view is wrong and that bank lenders are able to assess the 
meaning of national banking laws even though they are unable to monitor a single bank￿s risk-taking 
behaviour. In this case, lenders from at home and abroad would be able to infer from the national 
banking law which target rate of return and which success probability the domestic banks will choose, 
and they would use equation (5) to determine the rate of interest they require from the banks of a 
particular country. The national government would then likely take the behaviour of savers and banks 
into account when choosing its banking law. As national and international savers would receive an 
expected rate of return equal to the given world market rate of interest for safe assets, s ￿ 1, the 
government￿s policy choice would be irrelevant for households, but would affect the national banks￿ 
profit. National welfare maximisation would therefore be identical with the profit maximisation of a 
single bank with well-informed lenders. Integrating (5) into (6) would result in equation (11), and 
obviously it would be in the national government￿s interest to induce the domestic banks, by way of 
setting  ε, to choose a target return which satisfies (12) and to maximise the expected return from 
business lending. 
  Though logically possible, this scenario is not really convincing since it contradicts the Selection 
Principle.
13 The Selection Principle says that it is unlikely that systems competition will work since 
governments have concentrated on those economic activities where markets failed. Re-introducing the 
markets through the back door of systems competition is likely to bring about the same kind of market 
failure which induced the governments to become active in the first place. In the present context, the 
Selection Principle could imply that that international bank lenders are not only unable to assess a single 
bank￿s choices under risk but also that they cannot easily distinguish between the various national 
banking laws. There are currently 205 countries in the world, and there are nearly as many banking laws. 
                                                 
13 See Sinn (1997).   26
To assume that savers know what they get if they entrust their money to a bank in Fiji Islands, 
Madagascar or Turkmenistan would be courageous to say the least.  
  Thus, the situation of a national government may be similar to that of a single bank that faces 
ignorant lenders. If the government imposes a tough banking law which prevents or reduces 
opportunistic banking behaviour, it will not be able to convince lenders of the better quality of national 
bank bonds and will therefore not be able to reduce the rate of interest which the lenders request. The 
government will therefore have to take into account that the imposition of a minimum equity 
requirement makes domestic banks worse off and their lenders better off. If it were equally interested in 
both bank profits and the well-being of lenders, it would impose an equity requirement sufficient to 
satisfy the closed economy welfare maximum as defined by (12). However, given that many lenders 
come from abroad, it certainly is not that impartial.  
  Being elected by domestic residents, the domestic government will only take their situation into 
account and neglect foreigners, thus imposing a policy externality on other countries. In principle, there 
can be foreign bank owners and foreign lenders. Thus there may be  two types of policy externality. The 
first one results from asymmetric information and is inflicted on foreign bond holders; it is basically the 
lemons externality analysed in the context of the introductory banking model. The other one results from 
a sequencing or time inconsistency effect similar to the one analysed by Jensen and Meckling (see 
literature section, case i). It is inflicted on the bank￿s foreign shareholders who bought the shares 
knowing that they would have to bear the consequences of subsequent policy changes without being able 
to require a differential compensation. The asymmetry among these policy externalities reflects the fact 
that bank securities will be revolved regularly while shares are eternal contracts. Bank bonds are 
therefore assumed to be bought after, or simultaneously with, the government regulation decision, and 
shares are assumed to be bought before.     27
 Letα be the share of domestic residents among the people lending to domestic banks and β the 
share of the domestic banks  owned by domestic residents. Using the expected utility of bank lenders,  
 
      sF s p prF U − ε − + = ) 1 ( E  for   ε ≥ s rF , 
 
and, from (4), expected profit,  
 
    ε − − − = π s p F r q p ) 1 ( ) ( E   for   ε ≥ s rF , 
 
national welfare in the open economy can be written as  
 
    π β + α = E EU W . 
 
The competitive government will try to maximise W by choosing its policy parameter ε (the required 
minimum equity) appropriately. The government knows from the BLOOS rule (4) that a marginal 
variation of εwill affect the market outcome when  rF s ≤ ε but not when  rF s > ε . Taking account of the 
national banks￿ profit maximising reaction to a change in ε as given by (13), the government calculates 
the derivative of national welfare with regard to its policy parameter:  
 










α + − β − α =
ε q






) )( ( ’
d
d






which simplifies to  
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since 0 /d dE = π q will hold in the bank￿s optimum as defined by (7) - (9). Equation (14) shows that the 
sign of the derivative of national welfare with regard to the required minimum equity depends on two 
items. The first one represents the redistribution from banks to lenders which is brought about by a 
marginal increase in the equity requirement, given the bankruptcy probability  p − 1 . If the share of 
domestic lenders exceeded the share of domestic bank owners,  β > α , this welfare effect would be 
positive, but it is negative if the share of domestic bank owners is larger, i.e.  β < α . The second item 
reflects the fact that a higher equity requirement induces the banks to take fewer risks, i.e. to reduce the 
target return q and the corresponding bankruptcy probability  p − 1 . This helps the domestic lenders to 
the extent that the banks￿ equity capital falls short of the promised loan repayment,  rF s < ε , and to the 
extent that there are such lenders as measured by α. In principle, banks are hurt by a similar effect, but, 
at the margin, and in the banks￿ optimum, the disadvantage is exactly outweighed by the increase in the 
expected return from business lending. So only the effect on lenders has a net impact on welfare.  
  The overall impact on welfare of an increase of εis ambiguous, depending on the factors 
mentioned. Consider a few special cases which all refer to the range where the BLOOS rule is operative, 
i. e.   s rF / 0 ≤ ε ≤ .  
(i) There are no domestic lenders and no foreign bank owners:  
 







  0 = ε ⇒ opt . 
 
The competitive government does not impose any equity requirements on banking firms.    29
(ii) There are only domestic lenders and only foreign bank owners:  
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The competitive government imposes an equity requirement large enough so that the banks can always 
keep their repayment promises.  
(iii) Both domestic resident shares are positive, but the share of domestic lenders is at least as high as 
that of domestic bank owners. In this case, the first item in (14) is non-negative and the second is strictly 
positive as long as  rF s < ε . It follows that  
 












Once again it is optimal for the national government to impose an equity requirement large enough so 
that the banks will be able to repay their loans even in the case of bankruptcy.  
(iv) Suppose finally that the share of domestic lenders is positive, smaller than the share of domestic 
bank owners, and large enough to make sure that the second item in (14) outweighs the first one when 
0 = ε , i.e.  s p rF q p q ) 1 )( ( ) ( ’ d / d
) 14 ( − α − β > ε α . This is the case of an interior solution, because 
0 when 0 d / d = ε > ε W  and  s rF W / when     0 d / d = ε < ε . From the first order condition 
0 d / d = ε W we get, after a few manipulations:  
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opt where  s rF opt / 0 < ε < .   30
 
The national government imposes some regulation on the banks, but remains nevertheless too lax to 
completely prevent the BLOOS rule from becoming operative and inducing banks to take more risks 
than in the case of informed lenders or unlimited liability.  
  It is not entirely clear, which of these cases prevails most frequently in reality. However, it seems 
that the cases where banks are predominantly owned by nationals and borrow funds worldwide seem to 
be particularly relevant. While comparative international statistics are not available, the example of 
Germany confirms this impression. Foreigners possess only little more than 3% of the existing equity 
capital of German financial institutions,
14 but they hold 17% of the German banks￿ outstanding bonds 
and liabilities (see Figure 1). 
  When bank bonds are more widely distributed internationally than bank shares, systems 
competition would be described by case (iv) or could even be close to case (i) so that a corner solution 
with 0 = ε  prevails. Both cases characterise a lax regulatory behaviour of national authorities. In fact, the 
regulation would be too lax, for it is clear that the national regulatory optimum for the closed economy 
which results from  s rF / ≥ ε  and was characterised with (12), is also the optimum for the whole world. 
A proposition summarises the results. 
 
Proposition 4: International competition among bank regulators will not, in general, be efficient when 
regulators maximise national welfare, lenders are unable to monitor bank behaviour, and there are 
foreigners among the lenders and/or bank owners whose preferences are not taken into account by the 
regulators. If the share of domestic residents among the bank￿s owners exceeds the share of domestic 
residents among the bank￿s lenders, regulation will be too lax in the sense that national authorities do 
not, or not fully, exclude the opportunistic risk-taking behaviour resulting from the BLOOS rule.   31
  Again the different roles of lenders and firm owners and the nature of the effects imposed upon 
them must be emphasised. The effect on foreign lenders results from asymmetric information and the 
inability of these lenders to recognise variations in the risk of repayment. It is independent of the time 
period for which the bonds are issued and arises even with short term securities issued repeatedly by the 
banks. The effect on the bank￿s foreign owners instead results from the mere fact that an ownership title 
is a permanent link to a firm which then inevitably implies that the owners are affected by regulatory 
changes. It is possible that the profit implications of such changes were anticipated by foreigners before 
they acquired shares of a bank. In that case, these implications will have been capitalised in share prices 
and the foreigners will just earn the normal rate of return on their ownership titles. However, this is 
irrelevant for the regulator￿s incentives, as long as he cannot commit to a regulatory policy before the 
foreigners buy the shares. Whatever was anticipated in the share price, the regulator will know that 
foreigners are affected by marginal variations in his policy according to the size of the foreign share 
ownership then prevailing,  β − 1 , and this will distort his policy choice as modelled above. It would not 
even matter if foreigners could sell the bank shares after a policy move because the profit consequences 
will then certainly be capitalised in share prices and not affect the returns that purchasers can earn. 
  Things are different when policy-makers can commit themselves to a certain regulatory policy 
before bank shares are bought by foreigners. In that case, all profit implications even of marginal 
decisions will accrue to domestic residents only, and in the above model it would be necessary to set 
1 = β  to depict this case. This would mean that either case (iv) applies with a lower value of εor that 
there is even a corner solution with  0 = ε , similar to case (i). The concern that systems competition will 
result in an overly lax regulation would be strengthened. In general, what counts is the share of domestic 
residents among the banks￿ owners at the time the regulatory decisions are made or firmly announced, 
and this is how the parameter βshould be interpreted.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
14 According to the Bundesbank, foreigners hold 18.087 DM  billion of equity and direct participations. This is 3.2% of the   32
 
The Basel Committee and EU on the Right Track 
You can￿t get blood out of a stone. This wisdom explains why decision-making under risk is often 
distorted in the direction of excessive risk-taking when decision makers face possible losses, whose size 
exceeds their wealth or that part of their wealth which will be made liable for compensation. A bank￿s 
loan repayment liability is an example of this. When banks can choose between high target returns in 
business lending that occur with a low probability and low ones that occur with a high probability they 
may prefer the high target returns even though a lower expected return results. The reason for this type 
of risk preference is that higher probability of bankruptcy means a higher probability that ignorant 
lenders who are unable to monitor the bank￿s actions will not be able to collect the promised repayment. 
Lenders buy lemon goods and banks enjoy lower financing costs.  
  To avoid a market for lemon bonds national governments usually impose solvency constraints on 
domestic banks. However, in the process of globalisation where an increasing fraction of the banks￿ 
lenders come from abroad, the incentive for the national governments to impose tough solvency 
constraints diminishes, since part of the benefits of such constraints accrue to foreigners while a 
comparatively large fraction of the resulting increase in banking costs is borne by domestic residents. 
Thus there is the risk that systems competition will in fact be a competition of laxity where the problem 
of lemon bonds, which brought in the national governments in the first place, reappears on the 
international level. Once again, the Selection Principle is operative in systems competition.  
  In such a situation, an international harmonisation of solvency requirements seems appropriate. 
As mentioned in the introduction, more than a decade ago, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(1988) introduced its Capital Accord known as Basel I. Since then, the business of banking, risk 
management practices, supervisory approaches, and financial markets each have undergone significant 
                                                                                                                                                                         
total stock of equity reported by the OECD.   33
transformation, and many of the old provisions have proved to be no longer adequate. Thus, in June 
1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a proposal for a new bank capital adequacy 
framework, Basel II, to replace Basel I. At this writing, the consultation process is still under way, and it 
is expected that the new Accord will be applicable not before the year 2005.
15  
  The rationale for the Basel II Accord can be summarised by aiming at more flexibility and more 
risk sensitivity with regard to individual loans given out to private business. Banks have more choices, 
but they have to evaluate their borrowers more carefully and to underlay each individual loan with a 
specific amount of equity, depending on the risk class to which the borrower belongs. There is more 
emphasis on the combination of effective bank-level management, market discipline, and supervision in 
contrast to the focus on the single risk measure that was used in Basel I. Basel II intends to provide 
approaches which are both more comprehensive and more sensitive to risks than Basel I, while 
maintaining the overall minimum equity requirement of 8% of equity capital to risk-weighted assets. 
Unlike before, however, external credit assessments will be used to properly evaluate the true risk of 
business lending.  
  Basel II also aims at bolstering market discipline through enhanced disclosure by banks. 
Effective disclosure is essential to ensure that market participants can better understand banks￿ risk 
profiles and the adequacy of their capital positions. It reduces the lemons problem discussed in this 
chapter by informing lenders about the true risks they incur, thus helping systems competition to 
function better than it otherwise would do. However, the authors of Basel II certainly do not believe in a 
liberal approach where disclosure is all that is needed to avoid the asymmetric information among 
lenders and regulatory authorities which is the cause of the welfare loss resulting from systems 
competition. 
                                                 
15 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) for the details of the latest proposal.   34
  The review of Basel I complements a review already underway of EU legislation on bank capital 
requirements to shape a new EU capital adequacy framework. The revised EU bank capital legislation is 
supposed to replace the existing legislation on capital requirements which basically has been in place 
since 1988.
16 The aim of the revision is to ensure that European banks and investment firms are able to 
respond quickly to market changes and to guarantee both financial stability and the smooth functioning 
of the internal market in financial services. The EU proposal also focuses on minimum capital 
requirements, a supervisory review process, and an emphasis on market discipline. 
  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well as the European Commission want to 
create a new global capital framework that guarantees greater stability of the international financial 
system by better reflecting the changes in financial markets in recent years. By co-operating closely and 
by co-ordinating the timing of the review processes, both institutions ensure that the harmonisation rules 
do not contradict but rather complement one another. Basically, the policy response coincides with the 
recommendations following from the theoretical analysis of this chapter. Rather than relying on 
unbridled systems competition, collective international action is taken to avoid the welfare losses from 
lemon banking which otherwise might occur.  
  It should not be overlooked, though, that both the Basel and the EU approaches suffer from a 
lack of enforcement possibilities for countries not directly involved. The original Basel agreement was a 
voluntary commitment by the G-10 countries, and Basel II is a voluntary agreement backed by 13 
countries. The EU rules will be binding for all 15 EU countries, which will have to adjust their banking 
laws accordingly. Other countries, in particular Latin American and Asian countries, cannot be forced to 
obey the rules if they do not want to. In total only 19 out of 206 countries in the world have committed 
                                                 
16 See Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions.   35
themselves.
17 How the other countries will react and whether this number is enough to make systems 
competition workable remains to be seen.  
                                                 
17 The participating countries are the EU countries, Canada, USA, Japan and Switzerland.    36
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